Economic coercion and foreign policy: Evaluating the success of Russian bargaining with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

While the debate on the effectiveness of economic coercion is as long-standing as the reliance on sanctions as a recognised foreign policy tool, less attention has been paid to the particular case of the Russian Federation and its relationship with the neighbouring countries. Given the accumulation of recent incidents of economic diplomacy in the Eurasian region, and in view of the insistent need to refine the pool of possible determinants for effective advancement of Russia’s foreign policy objectives, the following work develops own predictions and verifies them on the cases of Russian bargaining with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Encouraged by the existing scientific gap, this research aims to detect causal pathways leading to favourable outcomes and reveal factors, which help translate bargaining advantage into political capital. Investigation of Russia’s bargaining interactions that took place within 2000 and 2013 not only found support for the limited success of coercive instruments against Kiev, Minsk and Chisinau, but also uncovered economic, regime and issue-specific attributes capable of enhancing Moscow’s ability to achieve its objectives.